Firstly, the authors – here Edward F. Kelly – maintain that their arguments will provide a solution to “the mind-body problem” (p. 1). Which problem? Philosophers no longer speak of a single “mind-body problem,” but identify various problems. Some have to do with the fact that the term “mind” is not univocal: depending on how one defines it, one may, for instance, think of (A) the problem of how something non extended can be identical with something extended (one of the Cartesian challenges) or (B) the problem of how mental states can be about something, that is, how they can be intentional (Brentano’s problem) or (C) how mental states such as beliefs or desires can be reasons that have physical effects such as bodily behavior even if mental concepts are not reducible to physical concepts (DonaldDavidson’s problem, cf. Davidson, 1980, chaps. 11-12) or (D) how material states can be conscious. Now, it often appears that the authors claim to address problem (D), which is today sometimes identified as the “hard problem” in the philosophy of mind (Chalmers, 1996). But this, again, is not just one problem. For instance, it is one thing to ask (D1) whether material states are identical to phenomenally conscious states (the experience of something as red rather than green, say; a problem hinted at by John Locke and nowadays especially advanced by Chalmers) or (D2) how it is possible to have a subjective or first-person perspective upon the world (Thomas Nagel’s problem; see Nagel, 1974). In any case, all of these problems depend on what we mean by speaking of “material states” – a question about which there is also little clarity (see Montero, 1999). The authors often fail to specify just which of these – or other – issues they are trying to address.
Secondly, the authors wish to reject materialism, apparently in all of its varieties.However, here too they are not fully clear about the state of the art concerning objections to materialism. Let us consider the variety of materialism called the identity theory – the view that mind and body are the same entity. A major objection Kelly et al. present and accept (on p. 4f.) is what is usually called the argument from multiple realizability. It is directed against the “type identity” thesis, that is, the strong materialistic claim that each type or natural kind of mental state is identical, or can be reduced to, to a certain type of brain state. As the objection goes, mental states cannot be type-identical to brain states because the “mind-brain system in general is enormously adaptable or ‘plastic’.” (p. 4) Friends of the argument from multiple realizability say that the very same type of mental state can be realized by a variety of physical states. An analogy may be helpful here: The same text can be found either in a book or a computer; that is, the same text is realized by different physical devices. Likewise,it is conceivable that mental states can be realized by different types of brain states. However,does that suffice to refute the type identity theory? Various objections would have to be considered. To begin, to conceive a possibility is not enough. If we do not yet know which types of brain states are identical with which types of mental states, that does not imply that an identity between them does not exist. Furthermore, there may be limits to the multiple realizability of mental states. Plausibly, there are constraints for which brain states are candidates for being realizers of, say, my experiencing a certain color (e.g., the brain states need to have certain causal properties to be able to realize an experience of a certain color;Kim, 1992). Finally, it may be that the assumptions of type identity and of multiple realizability are not incompatible. The widespread assumption that they are incompatible can be undermined by the quite reasonable demand to differentiate a bit. Perhaps we can and should group together certain brain states into neurophysiological types without this requiring that these types share all microphysical properties. These neurophysiological types might then be identical to mental types while allowing for multiple realization at the microphysical level(Pauen, 2003). To sum up, the authors have not argued clearly and cogently against their main opponent, materialism. While the type-identity theory as well as other forms of materialism may be unconvincing, Kelly et al. have not actually shown this, despite their strong rhetorical stance.
Thirdly, the authors apparently think that all psychologists have accepted the claim that consciousness is nothing more than a mere epiphenomenon of brain activity. In the few cases in which explicit statements of this supposed orthodoxy are cited in the Introduction, the authors are neurophysiologists like Antonio Damasio (cited on p. xx) or their philosophical supporters like the Churchlands (see, e.g. p. 51 n.), rather than psychologists. Moreover, what,or whom, do the authors mean by the all-embracing term “psychology”? One of us has described psychology as a Protean discipline, “suspended between methodological orientations derived from the physical and biological sciences and a subject matter extending into the social and human sciences” (Ash, 2003, p. 251). A volume edited by two of us,reviewed by the authors in this issue (Ash & Sturm, 2007), discusses a number of methods used in psychology, including the use of “paper tools” such as questionnaires – hardly a technique based on a commitment to an ontological physicalism. Do the authors really believe that all of the more than 150,000 professional psychologists, or even all of the thousands of basic scientists who still call themselves by that name, really accept “the materialistic consensus”? Some evidence might have made such assertions more credible.
Fourthly, let us turn to the authors’ acceptance of the so-called filter theory of the mind: The mind is “not generated by the brain but instead focused, limited, and constrained by it” (p. xxx). On this view the brain is something like a radio receiver or a television set receiving what the immaterial mind emanates. As a defective receiver reduces the quality of what it receives, so does a defective or impaired brain. So the good news is that Alzheimer’s disease may act upon your brain, but your mind may stay unaffected. The bad news is that you may not be sure that what your brain receives is emitted by your mind. It may stem from somebody else’s mind, your neighborhood psychic, your deceased relative, or whatever free floating mind happens to have the proper vibration. Paranormal phenomena are supposed to be evidence for this position; but we will discuss these in a moment.
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