That we are limited in our ability to know the truth because both perception and logic have their limitations is most likely not a new and stunning insight to most nexians.
The most well-known expression of this in western philosophy is probably that of Emanual Kants 'ding and sich' and the stated impossibility of realy knowing it.
But is there a way to bridge this gap between perception and the perceived objects?
Once on ayahuasca i had an idea about it that goes like this: If we know all of an objects possibility's, we know the object itself. It is ofcourse quite impossible to know ALL of an objects possibility's, even if it where just because of the fact that the possibility's of every object are (almost) infinite. Yet, infinite possibility's may arise from a set of rules that is very limited itself. Wittgenstein speaks of a 'logical space' that exists out of all possible logic connections a given number of objects have, dictated by the 'logical shape' each object has. The objects possibility's are defined here by it's logical shape that dictates all of it's possible logical connections.
Now this is the idea: if an object has a certain 'logical shape', in an ideal 'logical language', wouldn't you expect it's shape to have logical consequences for how it can be described by an unambiguous language?
Computers can recognise the work of an author by simply counting individual words in any given text. It appears that each author has something of a vocabulary fingerprint.
Now, if you'd gather all descriptions of an object you know to be factual (as description of a perception, so factual in the sense of verifiable), it may be quite possible that there will be some descriptions that are inconsistent (because the same object may be seen from different angles or at different moments) but there won't be descriptions of the object that are incommensurable.
If you take all these descriptions, you could project a whole cloud of logical connections between these descriptions.
Could a logical fingerprint of the object reveal itself in this cloud of connections like the vocabulary fingerprint of an author?
If you have this cloud of logical connections, from this cloud i think you'd be able to distill the logical language in wich you'd be able to describe the object in a way that is commensurable with all the other descriptions.
In other words: If you have these descriptions, you could distill a language out of them by filtering out a vocabulary and ways in wich these words (can) relate, leading to certain specific limitations in how you can speak of the object in a way commensurable with what has been said before. For instance, whether an object is imaginary or real determines how you can speak of it and if such a limitation would be dropped, two persons would no longer be able to decide whether they're speaking of the same object.
New perceptions could enlarge the object's vocabulary, but not the way in wich words to describe the object relate, because then we would no longer be able to determine whether a description is still a description of the same object.
Could the logical shape of an object at least partially reveal itself as this logical/linguistic fingerprint here, so could we know the object at least partially? Do we know the nature of an object if we'd know the language in wich you can speak of it?
Could we see through our perceptions and reveal the objects themselves by looking at the way perceptions are structured?
The most well-known expression of this in western philosophy is probably that of Emanual Kants 'ding and sich' and the stated impossibility of realy knowing it.
But is there a way to bridge this gap between perception and the perceived objects?
Once on ayahuasca i had an idea about it that goes like this: If we know all of an objects possibility's, we know the object itself. It is ofcourse quite impossible to know ALL of an objects possibility's, even if it where just because of the fact that the possibility's of every object are (almost) infinite. Yet, infinite possibility's may arise from a set of rules that is very limited itself. Wittgenstein speaks of a 'logical space' that exists out of all possible logic connections a given number of objects have, dictated by the 'logical shape' each object has. The objects possibility's are defined here by it's logical shape that dictates all of it's possible logical connections.
Now this is the idea: if an object has a certain 'logical shape', in an ideal 'logical language', wouldn't you expect it's shape to have logical consequences for how it can be described by an unambiguous language?
Computers can recognise the work of an author by simply counting individual words in any given text. It appears that each author has something of a vocabulary fingerprint.
Now, if you'd gather all descriptions of an object you know to be factual (as description of a perception, so factual in the sense of verifiable), it may be quite possible that there will be some descriptions that are inconsistent (because the same object may be seen from different angles or at different moments) but there won't be descriptions of the object that are incommensurable.
If you take all these descriptions, you could project a whole cloud of logical connections between these descriptions.
Could a logical fingerprint of the object reveal itself in this cloud of connections like the vocabulary fingerprint of an author?
If you have this cloud of logical connections, from this cloud i think you'd be able to distill the logical language in wich you'd be able to describe the object in a way that is commensurable with all the other descriptions.
In other words: If you have these descriptions, you could distill a language out of them by filtering out a vocabulary and ways in wich these words (can) relate, leading to certain specific limitations in how you can speak of the object in a way commensurable with what has been said before. For instance, whether an object is imaginary or real determines how you can speak of it and if such a limitation would be dropped, two persons would no longer be able to decide whether they're speaking of the same object.
New perceptions could enlarge the object's vocabulary, but not the way in wich words to describe the object relate, because then we would no longer be able to determine whether a description is still a description of the same object.
Could the logical shape of an object at least partially reveal itself as this logical/linguistic fingerprint here, so could we know the object at least partially? Do we know the nature of an object if we'd know the language in wich you can speak of it?
Could we see through our perceptions and reveal the objects themselves by looking at the way perceptions are structured?