JIM
Rising Star
"Isn't the argument too anthropocentric? What if some kind of alien race constructed the super computer that simulates our universe, and the simulation was made to simulate mainly their kind? In this double-what-if scenario (we are simulated, but by an alien race that has nothing to do with humanity), what are the possible implications to your original theory?"
Formally, the simulation-hypothesis includes the possibility that we are simulated by an extraterrestrial civilization. However, the inclusion is redundant. If the simulation-hypothesis is true, then we are living inside a computer, and whichever civilization built that computer is our "home" civilization by definition.
Of course, it is possible that the simulators and their ancestors are more similar to some extraterrestrial civilization in our universe (if there are any) than they are to us, so in that sense it is possible that we are simulated by the descendants of an alien-like civilization.
More generally, simulators might create many simulated people who are very different from their own ancestors, or who live in worlds that are very different from the one that the simulators live in. It is possible that we are living in such a simulation. I don't know of any way of estimating the probability that our hypothetical simulators (or their ancestors) are similar to us, or that their world is similar to the world we experience. (The original paper focuses on ancestor-simulations because the methodology is more solid for that case. It is less clear whether some kind of principle of indifference could also be applied to a reference class of "observer-moments" that are very different from one another. For more on the reference class problem, see Anthropic Bias.)
References:
N. Bostrom,
Formally, the simulation-hypothesis includes the possibility that we are simulated by an extraterrestrial civilization. However, the inclusion is redundant. If the simulation-hypothesis is true, then we are living inside a computer, and whichever civilization built that computer is our "home" civilization by definition.
Of course, it is possible that the simulators and their ancestors are more similar to some extraterrestrial civilization in our universe (if there are any) than they are to us, so in that sense it is possible that we are simulated by the descendants of an alien-like civilization.
More generally, simulators might create many simulated people who are very different from their own ancestors, or who live in worlds that are very different from the one that the simulators live in. It is possible that we are living in such a simulation. I don't know of any way of estimating the probability that our hypothetical simulators (or their ancestors) are similar to us, or that their world is similar to the world we experience. (The original paper focuses on ancestor-simulations because the methodology is more solid for that case. It is less clear whether some kind of principle of indifference could also be applied to a reference class of "observer-moments" that are very different from one another. For more on the reference class problem, see Anthropic Bias.)
References:
N. Bostrom,