And here's the rest ![Love :love: :love:]()
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Some definitions describe knowledge with the use of the term awareness, but our awareness can be in error, just like our senses/perception (such as when we receive sensory input that there turns out to more likely not to have a cause we're used to attributing it to like phantom vibrations, or lapse in sight or hearing), reasoning (errors or contextual mistakes that lead to an “erroneous” conclusion or next phase of reason or action), memory (memory is already considered highly fallible, with one operative function being that when we remember something after the first time we tend to build or recall the memory based on previous builds and recalls of the same memory), practice (doing something wrong without realizing it), inquiry (errors in the manner, considerations, and execution into an investigation), etc (and it's already been established that there is a distinction between the two, with knowledge appearing more binary and awareness being more open-ended). They can also be described with reference to understanding, but there are also plenty of instances in which one may be confident and solidified in an understanding and it be a misunderstanding, which indicates falsity, and knowledge has already be established as necessary to be true. Point being, this doesn't seem to constitute “knowledge” in a truly cohesive way, though will invariably be linked to knowledge when knowledge is actually possessed.
With some of the examples above we have covered some common forms of knowledge: procedural (“knowledge” of skills and processes), descriptive (“knowledge” of facts and information), acquaintance (“knowledge” of persons, places, and things), and tacit (information learned unconsciously or subconsciously).
Another scheme for classifying knowledge, that is a bit more binary, discerns between a posteriori (knowledge gained from sense experience) and a priori (knowledge gained by understanding a system, often related to some abstraction, such as the definition of words).
There's a philosophical camp that asserts there's information that one just knows (innate knowledge). All other problematic mentions aside, what about the same sense to be had in matters where we were wrong and we thought that we just knew? I can see us having an innate capacity for what we call knowledge, but can't align myself with the idea that some things we just know...
With regard to our own thoughts, I will concede that we perhaps know some of the contents of our own thoughts. It was Descarte who paradoxically affirmed the existence of his own mind by attempting to deny it. Simply, he found a rationale for how he could be wrong about the existence of the outside world and items in it, including his own body. Once he arrived at his own mind he deduced that it must exist for it has to in order to be able to attempt to deny its own existence. He then went on to concede to knowing the contents of his own thoughts. My only distinction is that I'm not sure any individual can know the full contents of all of their thoughts... do we not seem to learn things about ourselves and our thinking often (at least if we're paying attention)?
Intuition seems to be more of a sense than it is a faculty of mind, appearing to need the same interaction with mind as sense data from sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell.
And instinct seems to almost be biological rather than of a mental faculty, being centered more on innate response to potentially increase chances of survival.
Learning doesn't seem to constitute knowledge. Learning seems more so centered around the acquisition and manipulation of information, regardless of being true or false. Potentially false information is likely “learned” all the time in any given paradigm and identified by the paradigms own parameters.
Our minds appear to make shortcuts in how it uses information in order to filter and save us time. These mental shortcuts are called heuristics or cognitive biases. When these are left unchecked and we are unaware of them, the mechanisms can often lead us to erroneous conclusions in many contexts. And they seem prevalent at almost every level of thought since they arise from the subconscious. Thus, they get in the way in regards to what we know, if we know.
Again, if no one knows everything and no one is right all the time, then we all have false beliefs and not just about things perceived as unverifiable, but in matters where we can employ a system for some sort of verification as well.
Considering the above as well as the post about assumptions we can see how the matter regarding knowledge seems to come down to a felt sense. So is it more apt to say that we feel we know, than simply that we know?
If there's anything we can/do know, the size of such a class is quite possibly a great deal smaller than we would like to think...
So, I'm still wondering, how do we know what we know when we know (if we can)? Or do we more often than not just think we know? Should we not keep in mind the abstract underpinnings to knowing and knowledge that perhaps make it more of an open-ended concept than how we presently treat and use it?
One love
...
Some definitions describe knowledge with the use of the term awareness, but our awareness can be in error, just like our senses/perception (such as when we receive sensory input that there turns out to more likely not to have a cause we're used to attributing it to like phantom vibrations, or lapse in sight or hearing), reasoning (errors or contextual mistakes that lead to an “erroneous” conclusion or next phase of reason or action), memory (memory is already considered highly fallible, with one operative function being that when we remember something after the first time we tend to build or recall the memory based on previous builds and recalls of the same memory), practice (doing something wrong without realizing it), inquiry (errors in the manner, considerations, and execution into an investigation), etc (and it's already been established that there is a distinction between the two, with knowledge appearing more binary and awareness being more open-ended). They can also be described with reference to understanding, but there are also plenty of instances in which one may be confident and solidified in an understanding and it be a misunderstanding, which indicates falsity, and knowledge has already be established as necessary to be true. Point being, this doesn't seem to constitute “knowledge” in a truly cohesive way, though will invariably be linked to knowledge when knowledge is actually possessed.
With some of the examples above we have covered some common forms of knowledge: procedural (“knowledge” of skills and processes), descriptive (“knowledge” of facts and information), acquaintance (“knowledge” of persons, places, and things), and tacit (information learned unconsciously or subconsciously).
Another scheme for classifying knowledge, that is a bit more binary, discerns between a posteriori (knowledge gained from sense experience) and a priori (knowledge gained by understanding a system, often related to some abstraction, such as the definition of words).
There's a philosophical camp that asserts there's information that one just knows (innate knowledge). All other problematic mentions aside, what about the same sense to be had in matters where we were wrong and we thought that we just knew? I can see us having an innate capacity for what we call knowledge, but can't align myself with the idea that some things we just know...
With regard to our own thoughts, I will concede that we perhaps know some of the contents of our own thoughts. It was Descarte who paradoxically affirmed the existence of his own mind by attempting to deny it. Simply, he found a rationale for how he could be wrong about the existence of the outside world and items in it, including his own body. Once he arrived at his own mind he deduced that it must exist for it has to in order to be able to attempt to deny its own existence. He then went on to concede to knowing the contents of his own thoughts. My only distinction is that I'm not sure any individual can know the full contents of all of their thoughts... do we not seem to learn things about ourselves and our thinking often (at least if we're paying attention)?
Intuition seems to be more of a sense than it is a faculty of mind, appearing to need the same interaction with mind as sense data from sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell.
And instinct seems to almost be biological rather than of a mental faculty, being centered more on innate response to potentially increase chances of survival.
Learning doesn't seem to constitute knowledge. Learning seems more so centered around the acquisition and manipulation of information, regardless of being true or false. Potentially false information is likely “learned” all the time in any given paradigm and identified by the paradigms own parameters.
Our minds appear to make shortcuts in how it uses information in order to filter and save us time. These mental shortcuts are called heuristics or cognitive biases. When these are left unchecked and we are unaware of them, the mechanisms can often lead us to erroneous conclusions in many contexts. And they seem prevalent at almost every level of thought since they arise from the subconscious. Thus, they get in the way in regards to what we know, if we know.
Again, if no one knows everything and no one is right all the time, then we all have false beliefs and not just about things perceived as unverifiable, but in matters where we can employ a system for some sort of verification as well.
Considering the above as well as the post about assumptions we can see how the matter regarding knowledge seems to come down to a felt sense. So is it more apt to say that we feel we know, than simply that we know?
If there's anything we can/do know, the size of such a class is quite possibly a great deal smaller than we would like to think...
So, I'm still wondering, how do we know what we know when we know (if we can)? Or do we more often than not just think we know? Should we not keep in mind the abstract underpinnings to knowing and knowledge that perhaps make it more of an open-ended concept than how we presently treat and use it?
One love