gibran2 said:
You’re using a circular argument here. You start with the assumption that the object and the room exist physically – outside of consciousness – and then you try to explain consciousness in terms of “object permanence”.
Here are a couple of problems with your argument:
You presuppose that objects, rooms, people who place objects into rooms, and people who find objects in rooms all exist physically and independently of consciousness. You can’t show that consciousness depends on material existence by first presupposing the same.
I disagree. In this example, nothing is being presupposed. There is no need to assume either consciousness creates matter or matter creates consciousness when working through it. What I have done in this example of the room, is only to take a concrete observation into account and then look at the two hypotheses under question; namely consciousness is a result of matter, and matter is a result of consciousness. The first hypothesis explains this observation without any difficulty, while the last one doesn't really seem to be able to explain it without further ad-hoc hypotheses and assumptions.
gibran2 said:
Related to the first problem, you assume that consciousness cannot exist independently of perceiving entities – people who go in and out of rooms. The idea that consciousness is only in a room when a perceiving being is in the room makes no sense from the primacy of consciousness perspective.
Not really something new. The christian philosopher George Berkeley was a proponent of this form of subjective idealism. He saw a real problem with situations like that of the room, and concluded that if something is going to exist between observations, then it must be in the consciousness of somebody in the meantime. This something was, unsurprisingly in his case, God. You do the same kind of argument, just that you imply some kind of all-pervasive, unknown consciousness. This seems to me like a complete ad hoc, and it has really no explanatory power, no predictory power and it introduces new unknowns that make the hypothesis less likely (Occam's Razor). And in this case the objects under discussion exists independently of
our consciousness, because they are apparently defined by this all-pervasive consciousness you introduced, and the result is identical with the result of an objective, material world.
As for the rest of your post, I am not sure I follow your story. Are you by this implying that some kind of mind is just telling a story to itself? That there is no world, no people, no nothing - it's just a story told by some undefinable, unknown Mind or Consciousness that is... is where? Well, whatever floats your boat, but however amusing it is to entertain this -
how likely and rational does this seem at all? Regardless of your answer to that question, it remains completely metaphysical and thus completely removed from reality as we know it and not contingent upon how the universe actually works. Such an assertion or argument is pretty much on equal footing with my often used example of unicorns in every house, placed so no can find them. It's absurd, doesn't make much sense and is an assertion that can't, in strict terms, be touched at all by the very nature of its formulation.
I also raised many other problems you didn't care to reply to. It's fine if you don't want to, but I asked those questions not to necessary "prove" you wrong or anything, but just because I wonder how one should solve them/explain them satisfactory with your hypothesis.
As a final remark; if we first assume that there actually exists something outside our consciousness, i.e something that is ontologically objective, which there are many good arguments for doing, then we have (scientific) methods to determine whether or not something existing independently of our consciousness is likely or not.
All of our semantics aside gibran2, I am not sure that the problem of consciousness will ever be solved, or if it even can be. All the paradoxes seem to meet there, and they put you out for a real spin
